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The incoming Donald Trump administration has sparked a new debate over the value of school
vouchers in American education policy. But just how eﬀective are school vouchers? In new research
which examines a school voucher program in Milwaukee, Wisconsin, Michael R. Ford ﬁnds that
more than 40 percent of schools which received school voucher revenues now no longer exist. He
writes that this high voucher school failure rate is down to the design of the scheme itself.
Educational entrepreneurship and school failure, it seems, are two sides of the same coin.
President-elect Donald Trump’s campaign promise to spend $20 billion on school choice, as well his
choice of school choice supporter Betsy DeVos as Secretary of Education, has brought the issue of school vouchers
to the forefront of American education policy.  In no American city are the impacts of voucher policy better
understood than Milwaukee, Wisconsin, home of the nation’s largest and oldest urban school voucher program. 
The logistics of the Milwaukee Parental Choice Program (MPCP) are relatively simple. Milwaukee residents with
household incomes at or below 300 percent of the federal poverty level are able to direct a voucher (worth $7,323
for K-8 students) to the participating private school of their choice.
What started in 1991 as a small experiment in market-based education now educates almost twenty-ﬁve percent of
all publicly funded students in the City of Milwaukee.  The MPCP, by design, encouraged the creation of new private
entrepreneurial schools to compete with the traditional Milwaukee Public Schools (MPS) sector.  Indeed, between
1991 and 2015 121 new private schools opened their doors in order to participate in the voucher program. 
However, as Fredrik Andersson and I detail in new research, 67.8 percent of these start-up schools are no longer in
operation.  In fact, 41 percent of all private schools that ever received voucher revenues no longer exist.
Why is the voucher school failure rate in Milwaukee so high?  Why does it matter?  And what can the Milwaukee
experience teach policymakers considering new school voucher programs?
The failure rate is high due to both the very nature of voucher school policy, as well as the speciﬁc design of the
MPCP.  In 1955 economist Milton Friedman proposed school vouchers as a means of injecting market competition
into a monopolized government school sector that had grown indiﬀerent to parental and student needs.  Friedman’s
vision included the creation of new entrepreneurial schools.  Under basic market theory organizations that are
unable to compete eventually go out of business.  In retrospect, it should not be terribly surprising that so many
schools would fail in a robust educational marketplace.  However, the speciﬁc design of the MPCP exacerbated the
failure rate.
For much of the program’s history it was remarkably easy to open a new school.  If an entrepreneur had a building,
ﬁled a one-page form with the state, and was able to attract Milwaukee students who met the program’s income
eligibility requirements, the school was eligible to receive government funds.  Basic regulations requiring school
accreditation, the presence of a curriculum, and degreed teachers, were not implemented until the mid and late
2000s.  The uptick in regulation was a response to concerns about accountability for both performance, and the
increasing public investment in the voucher school sector.  However, the new regulations also increased the school
failure rate.  As can be seen in Figure 1 below, the numbers of failures increased from 2005, in part because of the
ability for the state to cut oﬀ funding to schools that failed to meet new program requirements.
Figure 1 – Start-Up School Entries and Failures
1/3
Certain
organizational and
program
characteristics
aﬀect a schools
failure risk.  First,
start-up schools
are four times as
likely to fail as
schools that
existed prior to
participating in the
voucher program. 
These schools
also tend to fail
within their ﬁrst
few years of
operation, and
only after ten
years does their
failure risk mirror
that of the
previously existing
schools.  Second,
religious schools
have a much
lower failure risk, likely due to the resources provided by their aﬃliation with an umbrella organization like the
Catholic Archdiocese.  Third, failure rates are, not surprisingly, a function of the program’s overall level of
regulation.  When the state requires more of voucher schools, fewer survive.
It is of course possible to argue that the failure of low-quality MPCP schools is a positive.  In an education
marketplace schools that cannot attract enough parents or meet basic state regulations should go out of business. 
However, the actions of Wisconsin policymakers, including the implementation of barriers to entry for new schools
and tougher standards for existing schools, reﬂect a desire to prevent school failures.  The public investment in
failed MPCP schools, estimated at almost $200 million, also calls into the question the overall taxpayer savings
attributable to school voucher programs.  Arguably most problematic is the disruption in students’ lives and
educations when a school suddenly closes.
So what are the lessons from the Milwaukee voucher experience?   First, school choice programs designed to
encourage entrepreneurship will also result in school failures.    Policymakers should expect schools to close, and
make certain that the impacts of school failure are considered during political debates over voucher policy. 
Processes for orderly school closures, including provisions for the transfer of student records and materials, should
be developed in order to minimize the disruption to students who attended failed schools, and the schools who that
must enroll these students moving forward.
Second, policymakers can reduce failure risk by requiring that schools be in existence for a number of years prior to
receiving vouchers, and/or requiring that schools be aﬃliated with a larger umbrella organization as a condition of
participation.   Both of these requirements, however, represent a trade-oﬀ between the beneﬁts of entrepreneurially
driven innovation and failure risk.  Milwaukee demonstrates that educational entrepreneurship and school failure are
two sides of the same coin.
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This article is based on the paper, ‘Determinants of Organizational Failure in the Milwaukee School Voucher
Program’, in the Policy Studies Journal.
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